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The recent subprime mortgage meltdown is undermining financial mar-
ket stability and has the potential to cause a true systemic breakdown, col-
lapsing the world's financial systems like a row of dominoes. This essay
uses the subprime crisis to demonstrate that existing protections against sys-
temic risk, which focus on banks and largely ignore financial markets, are
anachronistic and misguided. Because companies increasingly access fi-
nancial markets without going through banks, an effective framework for
containing systemic risk must focus on markets.
INTRODUCTION
N a forthcoming article, I examine financial-market anomalies and
obvious market protections that failed, seeking insight into the sub-
prime mortgage crisis.2 The crisis can be explained in large part by
three categories of factors: conflicts, complacency, and complexity. Run-
ning throughout these categories is a fourth factor-cupidity, but because
greed is so ingrained in human nature and so intertwined with the other
categories, it adds little insight to view it as a separate category.
For example, the excesses of the originate-and-distribute model of
mortgage securitization-under which mortgage lenders sell off loans as
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they are made which are then packaged into mortgage-backed securities
and sold to investors-can be managed by avoiding conflicts, such as
aligning the interests of the mortgage lenders and investors. 3 The excesses
of the form of complacency perhaps most responsible for the subprime
mortgage crisis-widespread investor infatuation with securities that
have no established market and, instead, are valued by being marked-to-
model-have at least in the near-term been discredited by the losses asso-
ciated with the subprime crisis itself.4 Complexity, the third category, was
a central culprit responsible for the failure of disclosure in the subprime
crisis, but viable solutions appear to be second best.5
The subprime crisis, however, has the potential to trigger an even more
systemic collapse of our financial markets for reasons that go beyond these
categories. The risk of this collapse ("systemic risk") is, more generally,
regarded as the risk that an economic shock-in the present case, the
subprime mortgage crisis-can trigger a chain of market and/or financial
institution failures, resulting in increases in the cost of capital or de-
creases in its availability. 6 Because systemic risk is positively correlated
with markets, investors cannot diversify it away. 7
Governments in the United States and abroad are seriously concerned
about the subprime crisis and its potential systemic consequences. 8 The
near-failure of Bear Stearns is just a recent example of these conse-
quences.9 I will use this crisis to demonstrate, however, that existing pro-
tections against systemic risk are insufficient.
ANALYSIS
In the past, regulators have thought about systemic risk primarily in
terms of institutional failures-since the Great Depression, for example,
a chain of bank failures;' 0 and also, since the near-failure of Long-Term
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16-17.
6. Schwarcz, supra note 1.
7. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 446 (6th ed. 2003) (arguing
that risk that is positively correlated with the market itself cannot be diversified away).
8. See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators' Ability to Respond to Threats to the
Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 1-3 (2007),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_househear-
ings&docid=f:39903.pdf; Lauren Young, Bernanke's New Entourage, Bus. WK., Feb. 11,
2008, at 60 (discussing the Federal Reserve's concern over the subprime mortgage crisis
and its potential systemic effect); Tony Pugh, Risky, Subprime Loans Fuel Mortgage Crisis,
CHARLESTON GAZETE, Aug. 15, 2007, at 3A (noting that there is "international concern
because U.S. mortgage debt has been packaged into securities that were sold around the
world").
9. See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs Rescue Backed by
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at Al.
10. In response to the stock market downturn of August 1929 and the crash of October
1929, depositors en masse attempted to convert their bank deposits into cash. Gary Rich-
ardson, Bank Distress During the Great Contraction, 1929 to 1933, New Data from the
Archives of the Board of Governors 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12590, 2006). Many banks were unable to satisfy all of these demands, causing them to fail
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Capital Management ("LTCM") in 1998, the failure of a large hedge fund
which could bring down its contractual counterparties. 1' Yet companies
increasingly obtain their capital from financial markets, not from banks
or other financial institutions. This shift, referred to as disintermedia-
tion, 12 makes financial markets increasingly central to any examination of
systemic risk. Some financial leaders are already beginning to call for an
expanded focus on markets.13
The subprime mortgage crisis confirms the importance of this ex-
panded focus. The crisis was triggered not by institutional failure but by
market failure. Once investors realized that highly-rated subprime mort-
gage-backed securities could lose money, they began shunning all com-
plex securitization products,14 including asset-backed commercial paper,
historically thought to be almost as safe as cash. 5 The impact of this crisis
is already becoming systemic, extending beyond mortgage- and asset-
backed securities to the auction-rate securities market, which many re-
and contracting the money supply. Id. These failures, in turn, caused many otherwise sol-
vent banks to default, and many companies, deprived of liquidity, were forced into bank-
ruptcy. FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 189 (2d ed. 1989); Richardson, supra, at 24.
11. William J. McDonough, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Address Before the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1,
1998) (discussing likely consequences of a systemic collapse triggered by a failure of
LTCM).
12. WESLEY B. TRUIrTT, THE CORPORATION 107-09 (2006); Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron
and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1309, 1315 (2002).
13. See, e.g., John Gieve, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Centre for
the Study of Financial Innovation Roundtable: Financial System Risks in the UK-Issues
and Challenges (July 25, 2006); Andre Icard, Deputy Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements,
Speech at the Fourth Joint Central Bank Research Conference on Risk Management and
Systemic Risk: Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk (Nov. 8, 2005), available at
www.bis.org/speeches/sp051108.htm (discussing the "evolution of systemic risk" to include
interdependencies among banks, financial markets, and market infrastructure); Yutaka
Yamaguchi, Deputy Governor, Bank of Japan and Chairman, Comm. on the Global Fin.
Sys., Speech for the Third Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk: Triangular
View of Systemic Risk and Central Bank Responsibility (Mar. 18, 2002), available at http://
www.bis.org/cgfs/conf/mar02h.pdf (warning that in order to understand systemic risk, one
must investigate the nexus among the banking system, financial markets, and the real econ-
omy). As this essay was going to press, the U.S. Department of the Treasury released a
Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (March 2008) that gives greater
attention to financial markets.
14. Cf Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1 (explaining that the sub-
prime mortgage crisis affected equity, mezzanine, and even senior classes of securities,
ultimately causing a general "loss of confidence in financial markets"). This problem is
sometime referred to as "adverse selection." In the subprime crisis, investors became un-
certain which securitization products were good and which were bad. Investors, therefore,
stopped investing in all securitization products. This partly resulted from an inability to
value some of the more complex mortgage-backed securities for which there was no active
trading market. Valuation therefore was priced off quantitative models. Marking-to-model,
however, creates intrinsic valuation uncertainties, and indeed the valuations priced off
those models proved hopelessly unreliable.
15. See Mary Brown, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Carries High Rise, INVES-
TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/08/commercial-paper.asp (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008) (noting that asset-backed commercial paper "can be referred to as a 'cash
equivalent[ ]' ").
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garded as highly liquid and secure,16 and to credit markets generally. 17
This, in turn, is causing market participants to avoid financial institutions,
such as investment bank Bear Stearns, with large portfolios of these
securities.
Existing protections against systemic risk are failing in the subprime
crisis because they focus almost exclusively on banks, not markets. Fur-
thermore, general regulatory protections against market failure-prima-
rily disclosure under the securities laws,' 8 and the "market discipline"
approach of the current Bush Administration' 9-are not directed against
systemic risk per se.
More tailored financial-market regulation is needed because systemic
risk is somewhat unique. It results from a type of "tragedy of the com-
mons" 20 in which the motivation of market participants "is to protect
themselves but not the system as a whole.... No firm.., has an incentive
to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of contagion for other
firms."'2' Even if market participants were able to collectively act to pre-
vent systemic risk, they might not choose to do so because the externali-
ties of systemic failure include social costs that can extend far beyond
market participants, such as widespread poverty, unemployment, and
crime.22 Market participants will not want to internalize these costs and
16. See Liz Rappaport & Kara Scannell, Credit Crunch: Auction Rate Turmoil Draws
Watchdogs' Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2008, at C2.
17. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Our Economic Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2008, at
A15 (observing "the paralysis of the credit markets"). Part of the reason that credit mar-
kets are generally affected is adverse selection as to credit counterparties, not merely ad-
verse selection as to securitization products. See discussion supra notel4. Investors have
become uncertain regarding which counterparties have large investments in questionable
securities, making such counterparties potentially financially shaky.
18. See, e.g., Greg Lumelsky, Does Russia Need a Securities Law?, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 111, 122-23 (1997) (observing that "[s]ince before the New Deal, the U.S. philoso-
phy of securities regulation has been based on the provision of continuous, accurate, public
disclosure as a remedy against fraud and as a way to reduce risk associated with the
purchase and sale of securities").
19. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Hedge
Funds and Systemic Risk, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial
Markets Conference (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/
speeches/2006/200605162/default.htm; Anthony W. Ryan, Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Mkts.,
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks Before the Managed Funds Association Conference
(June 11, 2007), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp450.htm. But cf supra
note 13 (noting the Administration's increasing focus on financial markets, presumably in
response to the subprime mortgage crisis).
20. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244
(Dec. 13, 1968) (exemplifying the tragedy of the commons by a commonly-owned pasture
that is overgrazed because no individual owner has the right to exclude use by other
owners).
21. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 31 (1999), available at http://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP].
22. The widespread poverty and unemployment caused by the Great Depression, for
example, apparently fostered a significant increase in crime. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United
States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002) (discussing an explosion of executions as probably
resulting from increased crime due to the Great Depression).
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thus will take an insufficient amount of care in preventing them. There-
fore, like a tragedy of the commons, the benefits of exploiting finite capi-
tal resources accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is
motivated to maximize use of the resource, whereas the costs of exploita-
tion, which affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider
class of persons.
Individual market participants also may choose to act selfishly because
their returns are assured, whereas a systemic collapse is not necessarily
inevitable. LTCM, for instance, knew there was a risk of failure if the
markets became irrational, but it chose to stick with models that made
money. 23 Ignoring a possible greater risk for the sake of personal gain is
not unique to the world of finance. Before the Challenger space shuttle
disaster, engineers knew of the risk that the rubber 0-rings might fail at
cold temperature and argued that the launch should be delayed until
warmer weather. Engineers also identified the potential for wing damage
before the Columbia disaster. In both cases, however, NASA administra-
tors appeared to have been less concerned about the possible safety risks
than about the impact on their personal reputations of canceling flights.2 4
So what can we do? It would be ideal to eliminate the risk of systemic
collapse, ab initio. This could be achieved by preventing financial panics,
since they are often the triggers that commence a chain of market fail-
ures. For example, doubt arising over a financial market's future liquidity
can trigger a stampede to sell first while the market is still liquid, thereby
inadvertently destroying the market's liquidity. Contractual counterpar-
ties rush to try to close out their positions, causing prices to drop
sharply, 25 which in turn leads to a vicious cycle in which prices plummet
and investors lose confidence. 26
23. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 71-75, 173 (2000).
24. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE
FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 159-61 (2007).
25. This vicious cycle can be exacerbated by the common requirement that a securities
account be adjusted in response to a change in the market value of the securities. An
investor, for example, may buy securities on credit from a securities broker-dealer, secur-
ing the purchase price by pledging the securities as collateral. To guard against the price of
the securities falling to the point where their value as collateral is insufficient to repay the
purchase price, the broker-dealer requires the investor to maintain a minimum collateral
value. If the market value of the securities falls below this minimum, the broker-dealer will
issue a "margin call" requiring the investor to deposit additional collateral, usually in the
form of money or additional securities, to satisfy this minimum. Failure to do so triggers a
default, enabling the broker-dealer to foreclose on the collateral. Zvi BODIE ET AL., IN-
VESTMENTS 78-79 (7th ed. 2008). Although "marking-to-market" in this fashion can make
trading performance transparent and prevent managers and traders from concealing losses,
the "collective and mechanical exercise of such discipline on a widespread scale after a
large market shock can create the type of liquidity spiral that leads to a market crisis."
John Kambhu, Neel Krishnan & Scott Weidman, Part 2: Current Trends in Economic Re-
search on Systemic Risk, 13 ECON. POL'Y REV. 17, 17 (2007).
26. Cf PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 21, at 23 (observing that the "indi-
rect impact" on markets of the failure of individual market participants is potentially
"more serious" than such failure itself: "[v]olatility and sharp declines in asset prices can
heighten uncertainty about credit risk and disrupt the intermediation of credit[,]" which in
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It is impossible to prevent financial panics because they "can be set off
by any number of things."'2 7 In the context of the subprime mortgage cri-
sis, for example, scholars and politicians talk about imposing "suitability"
requirements on mortgage loans and otherwise restricting "predatory"
lending.28 These types of solutions not only potentially increase the cost
of credit and restrict its availability29 but, more importantly, fail to ad-
dress the next financial crisis, which may be unrelated to home values or
mortgages.
Broader actions, such as the Federal Reserve's bailout of Bear Stearns,
can help; but they focus on symptoms of the disease-in this case, finan-
cial institution failure-not on the disease's underlying cause. Ultimately,
therefore, these actions are likely to be very costly, especially if the symp-
toms spread and more financial institutions go bust. And, if the symptoms
become too widespread, they may fail utterly.
The focus, instead, should be on treating the underlying disease-
which in this case is financial-market collapse due to a loss of investor
confidence. Bear Stearns, and potentially other financial institutions as
well, are in trouble not because of problems with economic fundamentals
but because of falling prices of mortgage-backed securities, requiring
these institutions to mark their securities down to the collapsed market
prices. That, in turn, creates fear among these institutions' contractual
counterparties, who then (as in Bear Stearns' case) refuse to have further
dealings with the institution.
If market prices of these securities can be raised to levels that more
closely reflect their real value, this fear would dissipate. Moreover, once
investors regain confidence, credit markets will reopen, mortgage money
will once again become available, and home prices will begin rising. This
is a sensible market solution to the otherwise intractable problem of
home foreclosures resulting from the collapsing housing market.
PROPOSAL
Regulatory responses therefore should focus on restoring investor con-
fidence in financial markets-in this case, starting with the markets for
mortgage-backed securities. Raising confidence, however, requires that
parties begin investing again in these markets. At least at the outset, the
government itself may need to act as an investor of last resort for this
turn "could cause a contraction of credit and liquidity, and ultimately[ ] heighten the risk of
a contraction in real economic activity").
27. Eduardo Porter, Shanghai What-If. How a Shock Can Become a Shock Wave, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at WK3 (quoting an observation by Alan Blinder, a Princeton Univer-
sity economist and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve).
28. See Laurence E. Platt, Predatory Lending Developments, 1590 PRAC. LAW INST./
CORP., 37 (2007).
29. G. Marcus Cole, Wm. Benjamin Scott & Luna M. Scott Professor of Law, Stanford
Univ., Speech at the University of Utah Law Review Symposium: Subprime Meltdown:
The Law and Finance of the American Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis (Feb. 25, 2008).
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purpose. 30 (This is radically different from so-called "liquidity injections"
by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank in response to the subprime mortgage
crisis, which do not actually ensure market liquidity but merely provide a
more attractive borrowing environment for banks. 31)
By acting as an investor of last resort, however, the government poten-
tially creates two costs. The first is moral hazard-the greater tendency
of people who are protected from the consequences of risky behavior to
engage in such behavior 32-which would result if the government's action
assures speculators that their investments would be safe if market prices
ever collapse. The second cost is the shifting of the economic burden
from market participants to taxpayers, who effectively would fund the
government's investments.33 Nevertheless, both of these costs can be
managed and arguably avoided.
To mitigate moral hazard, the government as investor could follow a
policy of "constructive ambiguity" under which it has the right but not the
obligation to purchase securities, and the rules by which it decides
whether to purchase would be uncertain to third parties. 34 (This con-
trasts sharply with the Federal Reserve Bank's bailout of Bear Stearns.)
To further mitigate moral hazard and to avoid shifting costs to taxpayers,
the government should purchase securities only at a deep enough dis-
count to ensure ultimate repayment of its investments, ideally at a profit,
while stabilizing market prices well below the levels paid by speculating
investors.
Even if these costs cannot be completely eliminated, governmental ac-
tion should be justified because of the devastating effect of a systemic
collapse of the financial system. For example, just taking into account
direct, but not social, costs, 3 5 the tab from the subprime mortgage crisis-
even if it does not cause a full systemic collapse-"could run up to $500
billion" globally. 36 When there is an indeterminate risk of catastrophic
30. Cf E. PHILLIP DAVIS, DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 268
(1992) (suggesting there may be a need for a "market maker of last resort" to protect
financial markets).
31. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, The Basics: The Banks Roll Up Their Sleeves, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at 2 (Wk. in Rev.) (observing that when the Federal Reserve makes
"liquidity injections" into the banking system, "the [Federal Reserve] doesn't even use real
money[,]" and explaining that liquidity results from offering Federal Reserve loans to
banks at the discount rate, a lower interest rate than the "Fed funds rate" that banks would
charge other banks on interbank loans).
32. See, e.g., Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 84 (1986).
33. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 961-66 (2000) (discussing the moral hazard and
taxpayer costs created when the IMF acts as a lender of last resort to financially-troubled
nations).
34. Cf DAVIS, supra note 30, at 123.
35. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing social costs).
36. David Henry & Matthew Goldstein, The Bear Flu: How It Spread, Bus. WK., Jan.
7, 2008, at 30, 32. See also Tightening the Safety Belt, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2007, at 77
(depicting a graph showing Goldman Sachs' prediction of $148 billion of losses on sub-
prime collateralized-debt obligations); Postcards from the Ledge, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19,
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events or large, irreversible effects, regulators often apply a precaution-
ary principle that presumes benefits will outweigh costs.
37
One may ask: If the government can profitably invest to stabilize mar-
kets, why will private investors not do the same, eliminating the need for
governmental interference? At least part of the answer is that individuals
at investing firms engage in herd behavior, not wanting to jeopardize
their reputations and jobs by causing their firms to invest at a time when
other investors have abandoned the market.38 An investor of last resort is
needed to correct this market failure.
Who should act as the investor of last resort? In a U.S. national con-
text, the Federal Reserve Bank would be the most logical choice, al-
though its power to act in this capacity is ambiguous under existing law.
39
In a foreign national context, the obvious contender for investor of last
resort would be the nation's central bank. In a multinational context,
however, the choice is less obvious. One possibility is the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), which sometimes takes on this type of role by
providing liquidity to troubled countries.40 Other possible choices include
one or more national central banks, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank or the European Central Bank, although any national central bank
acting as an investor of last resort would face possible conflicts of interest
between its national and international responsibilities.
41
2007, at 10 (estimating that in the U.S., "[s]ubprime borrowers will probably default on
$200 billion-300 billion of mortgages").
37. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841,
848 (2006).
38. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2000) (discussing herd behavior).
39. The Federal Reserve Act defines the Fed's authority. See Federal Reserve Act of
1913, 38 Stat. 263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In "unusual
and exigent circumstances," the Act enables "the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System [to] authorize any Federal reserve bank ... to discount for any individual,
partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange" if such individual, partner-
ship, or corporation is "unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other
banking institutions." Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2000). Although this
may well enable the Federal Reserve Bank to save failing non-bank institutions, such as
Bear Stearns, it is dubious whether it enables the Bank to purchase securities in falling
markets. If, therefore, the Federal Reserve Bank is to act as an investor of last resort, the
Federal Reserve Act may need to be amended.
40. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 33, at 961.
41. Although one might question whether a single international investor of last resort
is feasible given the different approaches to financial regulation and supervision among
various nations of the world, these differences do not appear to undermine the concept of a
unified regulatory approach to systemic risk. International cooperation is the natural and
most effective response of states that share an interest in averting a common crisis that
affects them individually-despite the many historical, cultural, and legal differences that
distinguish nations. See, e.g., James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International
Cooperation, 52 INT'L ORG. 269, 271 (1998); RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN,
FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 120-123 (1995) (suggesting that sys-
temic risk is analogous to epidemiological risk, in that both can be resolved effectively by
international collaboration when "countries agree[ ] on how to act ... [and their] coopera-
tion advance[s] to the point of establishing an international agency and jointly financing
international action to control and attempt to eradicate" the contagion). Basel II effec-
tively illustrates, for example, that a single regulatory scheme for financial risk can be ap-
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My goal, however, is less to suggest who should act in these capacities
than to urge that one or more governmental organizations do so before it
is too late.
plied, at least in the banking context, across diverse national financial systems. See Press
Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Basel II and Financial Institution Resiliency (June 27,
2007), http://www.bis.org/press/p070627.htm.
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